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A CALL FOR AN OFFICIAL NAVAL DOCTRINE

by

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


A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of
A CALL FOR AN OFFICIAL NAVAL DOCTRINE

The Navy needs an official doctrine, now more than ever. As the importance of the Maritime Strategy diminishes in proportion to the former Soviet threat, the Navy must make fundamental reassessments to successfully incorporate the changes necessary to face the combat realities of the 21st century. Although much has been written about doctrine, almost none of it is from a naval perspective. This paper analyzes why. It begins by examining Army doctrine and the foundation it provides. By then reviewing the differences inherent in land and sea power, it provides an appreciation for why the Navy approaches doctrine differently. The paper then looks at arguments on both sides of the naval doctrine debate. Finally, the paper points out the expanding role of the Navy in contingency and joint operations, and it identifies the need for doctrine to provide a comprehensive way of thinking and fighting to win in those arenas. The paper does not attempt to determine what naval doctrine should be, but only whether it is needed. The paper concludes that despite the enormously difficult challenge, the Navy must develop an official doctrine.

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A CALL FOR AN OFFICIAL NAVAL DOCTRINE

I. INTRODUCTION

The Navy needs an official doctrine, now more than ever. The Maritime Strategy bode well in the 1980s, but its importance has diminished in proportion to the former Soviet threat. In order for the Navy to successfully incorporate the changes necessary to face the combat realities of tomorrow, fundamental reassessments must be made today.

Although much has been written about doctrine, almost none of it is from a naval perspective. This paper seeks to determine why. It begins by looking at Army doctrine and the foundation it has provided in recent years. By then examining the differences inherent in land and sea power, one gains an appreciation for why the Navy approaches doctrine differently. Ten years ago, the Navy adopted its revolutionary Maritime Strategy. But global change, new technology, and fiscal constraints now demand the Navy take its next step.

Powerful figures and convincing arguments loom on both sides of the naval doctrine debate. Yet both sides generally agree it will take more than just traditional thinking and new technology to prevail in the future. As demonstrated in the ground war against Saddam Hussein, Army doctrine proved extremely successful under fire. The Navy needs exactly such a foundation. Change demands new ideas, new assumptions, new

approaches, but only doctrine can channel them into a comprehensive way of thinking . . . and fighting. Despite the enormously difficult challenge, the Navy must develop an official doctrine. Only then can it adequately and efficiently prepare for the challenges of the 21st century.

II. DOCTRINE DEFINED

Current Definitions. Doctrine can be summed up in three words: how to fight. This basic concept inspires a wide range of definitions, but it is best described as a "set of beliefs based on historic precedent that forms a framework for military action," but it is not a "statement of national policy or even military strategy."¹ Our Basic National Defense Doctrine, Joint Pub 0-1, calls it

an accepted body of professional knowledge
[that] comprises fundamental principles by which the
military forces or elements thereof guide their actions
in support of national objectives Fundamentally,
the purpose² of doctrine is to aid thinking--not to
replace it.

Doctrine is, therefore, dynamic, not static. It is continually affected by theory, technology, trial-and-error, and even individual efforts to improve the profession of arms. In recent years, the Army has led the development and practice of military doctrine.

Air Land Battle. Gen Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Commanding General of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, remarks:

Doctrine determines how we fight, what forces look like, how they train, how they will be equipped and what we expect of our leaders.³

He strongly points out the need for doctrine to lead the way, to be responsive as threats change, and to evolve rather than to stand still.

In its basic warfighting manual, FM 100-5, Operations, the Army has done just that by solidly laying out an entirely new approach to maneuver warfare called AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine. Four basic tenets generate and apply combat power: initiative, agility, depth and synchronization. The manual also notes "To be useful, doctrine must be uniformly known and understood."⁴ This can only be achieved by "ensuring that the Army in general, and individual soldiers in particular, understand and accept the general principles from which they operate."⁵ Consequently, the Army puts ALB doctrine into practice at every level, teaching and testing it in their professional education system, and implementing it in warfighting exercises. But the ultimate test, Operation Desert Storm, was a textbook execution of ALB doctrine. It "clearly outclassed the plodding tactics of the Iraqis, who had been taught by Soviet instructors."⁶

AirLand Battle Future. As part of this evolutionary process, the Army has reevaluated ALB and is moving on to a new generation of doctrine, aptly named AirLand Battle Future (ALBF). In preparing for the more fluid and deadly battlefields of the future, experts expect ALBF doctrine "will use to advantage the quality of our equipment and the competence of our professional force to create a nonlinear battlefield where . . . its cycle of disperse, mass, fight, redisperse and reconstitute appears to reduce the risk of the grinding attrition battle."⁷ Military Review reports ALBF

doctrine is "designed to thrust the Army into the 21st century and to meet the needs of an army facing a multipolar world order and multidimensional threat, while considering the underlying realities of force and resource reductions."⁸

Given the importance the Army places on doctrine, ALBF will have a major impact on our future ground forces and their equipment. Ultimately, they will be better prepared for the next conflict. As the Army has demonstrated, doctrine--not military failure--must drive the process. Even though its missions may be very different, this doctrinal foundation is just as critical to the Navy.

III. NAVY'S APPROACH

Conceptual Differences. Compared to the Army's doctrinally driven approach, the Navy has seemingly taken an altogether different path. This is mainly due to a number of conceptual differences in the way armies and navies view warfare.

Traditionally, navies tend to think in terms of strategy, while armies think in terms of doctrine. In his classic work, Military Strategy, Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie attributes this to the connotation of the word "strategy," which is not the same for a soldier, sailor, or airman. Specifically,

Where the sailor or airman thinks in terms of an entire world, the soldier at work thinks in terms of theaters, in terms of campaigns, or in terms of battles Where the sailor and the airman are almost forced, by the nature of the sea and the air, to think in terms of a total world or, at the least, to look outside the physical limits of their immediate concerns, the soldier is almost literally hemmed in by his terrain.

The sailor approaching war does not encounter the same limitations as the soldier. The sailor sees war more as a separate series of encounters or contacts. These contacts are "tactical" operations, and everything outside of contact is considered "strategic." Conversely, the soldier sees operations tied more to the theater, with actions in theater mainly "tactical" and anything above that level "strategic."¹⁰ Over time, these perceptions have created divergent views on the concepts of strategy and doctrine. Sailors and soldiers simply use and understand the terms differently.

A more practical description of naval strategy is provided by Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles (Ret.):¹¹

A strategic concept is a verbal statement of:

- What to control
- For what purpose
- To what degree
- When to initiate control
- How long to control and, in general,
- How to control in order to achieve the strategic objective.

Objectives are the critical points, but objectives also tend to be perceived differently by soldiers and sailors. As Colin Gray points out, "armies most often have occupation (or possession) goals, while navies have use or denial-of-use goals. . . . In contrast to the land, the sea is a medium of movement. It cannot be occupied and fortified."¹² These fundamental differences between armies and navies have created "two reasonably distinct 'cultures,' whose mutual comprehension has left much to be desired."¹³

Gray also notes there are a number of enduring geopolitical differences between the land and the sea:

The natural condition of the land is to be politically controlled. The natural condition of the sea, in sharp contrast, is to be uncontrolled. States seek to control the open seas in order to affect or influence what is happening on the land.¹⁴

These geopolitical differences then shape the operations of both soldier and sailor. Soldiers are much more dependent on others to guard their rear areas and their flanks, and to transport and protect from the air and the sea. To best do their job, they prefer to control those forces supporting them. The sailor, however, is much less dependent on others

and feels he can best accomplish his maritime mission, and, subsequently, support the land war, without intrusion by the other services.¹⁵ These operational differences must be considered in any discussion of warfighting on land or at sea.

Naval freedom of action has dominated maritime thinking for centuries. Unable to communicate with either military or political superiors once out of sight of land, naval officers relied on their professional judgment, authority, and autonomy to accomplish their missions. This freedom of action, coupled with the inherent flexibility and mobility of naval forces, is still the foundation for present day maritime strategy. Decentralized control and autonomous operations may work well for a navy, but this is rarely the case with a large, slower moving, terrain restricted army. Whereas a sort of unitary authority approach still dominates the Navy from the quarter-deck to the bureau chief, there has traditionally been little room for the collective, coordinated ideas characterized by Army staff arrangements.¹⁶

These different tactical, operational and geographical approaches have produced two separate theories of warfare, which have never been successfully reconciled. One focuses on land power theory and destruction of the enemy (Jomini and Clausewitz), while the other deals with maritime strategy and control of the sea to project power onto land (Mahan and Corbett). These intellectual underpinnings of service

autonomy must also be understood in any discussion concerning service doctrines.¹⁷

Maritime Strategy. Given these conceptual differences, the Navy has dealt little with doctrine at the service level. Instead, it has relied on the Maritime Strategy and the fundamental naval principles of Mahan and Corbett. The Maritime Strategy was developed in response to a request from the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William N. Small, in 1982. He realized the Navy needed to restate its rationale and strategy to justify the naval expansion of the 1980s.¹⁸ The strategy focused mainly on the global Soviet threat and was identified as the naval component of the National Military Strategy. It set forth three phases. The first dealt with deterrence in crisis situations that could involve superpower confrontation. Should deterrence fail, it also involved the transition of naval forces to a wartime footing. The second phase called for seizing the initiative and establishing maritime superiority over the Soviets. The third phase continued the destruction of the Soviet fleet begun in phase two by aggressively carrying the fight to the enemy. The ultimate goal of the Maritime Strategy was to use maritime power, in combination with the other services, to terminate the war on terms favorable to the U.S. and our allies.¹⁹

The Maritime Strategy was well received in Congress and throughout the Navy. It stimulated a resurgence in strategic thinking and led to many heated debates over the role and use

of maritime power. In the ten years since it first appeared, "a virtual avalanche of articles, books and papers were produced which used the Maritime Strategy to justify weapons systems, develop operational concepts, rework operational plans to defend geographic theaters and apply the concepts to operations with allied navies."²⁰ In many ways, the Maritime Strategy has accomplished much of what doctrine did for the Army.

The Way Ahead. Just as doctrine must evolve to be useful, so too must the Maritime Strategy. As we move into the post-Cold War era and focus beyond the former Soviet Union, our emphasis has also shifted to maintaining global stability. In a 1991 article, "The Way Ahead," the Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett, III, identified the following dilemma:

What do we do with a maritime strategy formulated during the Cold War, focused primarily on global conflict with the Soviet Union? The answer: we extract the strategy's enduring principles, and apply them to current planning. The maritime strategy itself remains on the shelf . . . ready to be retrieved if a global threat should reemerge.²¹

Three of those enduring principles have been previously identified by the Navy as:

1. Forward peacetime naval presence remains essential for deterrence and rapid crisis response.
2. Naval force structure must mirror the policy objectives and mirror requirements that naval policy dictates.
3. Naval warfighting doctrine based on operational experience remains valid at any level of conflict, should deterrence fail.²²

But just what is naval warfighting doctrine? Given the inherent differences between land and sea warfare, does the Maritime Strategy suffice, or should the Navy reach a consensus on just what its doctrine is? These issues form the basis for the debate surrounding the call for an official naval doctrine.

IV. THE DEBATE

As the unchallenged maritime power of the seas with over 200 years of naval tradition to rely on, does the Navy really need a doctrine? All three sister services have stated doctrines, yet the Navy does not. The following are a few selected arguments reflecting both sides of this issue.

Maritime Strategy is Equivalent to Doctrine. The Maritime Strategy fulfilled many of the same functions as ALB doctrine did for the Army. It was extremely effective in countering the Soviet threat and acting as a concept of operations. The problem arises when that threat disappears. Without a clear and present danger on which to focus public and naval opinion, developing an unspecific strategy to handle an unspecific or even unpredictable threat will be extremely difficult. Ultimately, the Navy will have a tough time defending and supporting any such strategy.²³

The Navy must also deal with planning assumptions that are fundamentally different from those dictated by the former Soviet Union. Since most of our future threat is predicted to come from Third World countries, few of those old assumptions will remain useful.²⁴ A recent Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort report pointed out:

Although another nation and navy may someday rise to test our resolve on the high seas, our focus will shift from blue water, open ocean operations to the littorals, choke points, and sea lines of communication that could be contested by a small, yet potent navy. In balancing requirements we will place more emphasis on shallow

water mine and anti-submarine warfare, operating in confined and congested waters, and in conducting operations in waters adjacent to land threats. Our current weapon systems are largely optimized for use against a blue water opponent, and the naval force that is optimized for the open ocean environment is not necessarily best equipped to venture into areas that preclude sea room and deep water.²⁵

Systems, tactics and people must all be prepared to fight in brown as well as blue waters. Doctrine, not strategy, is the bridge that binds these three elements into combat capability. A strategy, whether it's theater specific or more strategic, can then be developed in an iterative process based on that doctrine. Otherwise, we risk creating a strategy that will not succeed. Just as policy drives strategy, so too must doctrine as an integral part of the entire process.

Naval Doctrine is Implied. Many argue that the Navy does in fact have a doctrine because it is implied. The mission of the Navy has been clearly defined by Congress. From this mission flows a number of functions, such as sea control and power projection, which then defines the type of doctrine the Navy should follow. The Navy also relies on a set of corporate beliefs and traditions concerning naval warfare to consciously select certain concepts that are well matched to capabilities.²⁶ Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, President of the Naval War College, claims there is actually more doctrine in the Navy than one might think. In fact, he says "The elements are there, but it's just not called doctrine." As he points out, "Doctrine tends to imply a barrier to

flexibility and mobility." Since these are fundamentals of naval power, it's understandable why he says "the Navy just has an aversion to calling it doctrine."²⁷

A recent paper written at the Naval War College tried to identify these implied naval principles by analyzing the Maritime Strategy, Fleet Commander fighting instructions, and specific volumes of Naval Warfare Publications. The following list was extracted from those fleet fighting instructions.²⁸

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF NAVAL DOCTRINE

1. MASS
 - Defense in depth
 - Mutual support
 - Carrier Battle Group Organization
2. CONCENTRATION OF FIREPOWER
 - Massing of strike assets
 - Unified command structure (CWC)
 - Coordinated fire
 - Reliable information management
3. PREEMPTION [or strike effectively first]
 - Strategic and tactical offensive posture (surprise, dislocation, disruption)
 - Counterdetection technique
 - Speed and maneuver
4. DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION
 - Preplanned responses
 - Realistic training
 - Doctrinal simplicity
 - Independence from sophisticated C3I
 - Survivability and self-defense
5. OVERWHELMING FORCE
 - Technological superiority
 - Superior training, readiness, and personnel
 - Sea supremacy

Given these implied principles and the success of tactical doctrine, perhaps an official naval doctrine is not necessary.

On the other hand, missions, functions, and principles do not readily equate to doctrine. The difficulty comes in determining how best to integrate them. This could actually be called the common sense approach to doctrine. Given the "what," one expects common sense will then dictate the "how," based on fundamental naval principles. This assumption is extremely dangerous, especially given Clausewitz' assertion that "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult."²⁹ Perhaps doctrine is nothing more than common sense for the Great Captains of this world, however, as Capt John F. Schmitt, principle author of USMC FMFM 1, Warfighting, correctly points out, "Certainly, such men are among us today. But we should not deceive ourselves; they are very few. What about the rest of us not gifted with the same clarity of vision?"³⁰

In Warfighting, the Marines simply put together a cohesive and official doctrine to raise the general level of competence of the average soldier. They tried "to give the rest of us the same opportunity for success by formalizing what the geniuses have known all along."³¹ This is the real key to doctrine, to create a baseline of thought for the average soldier on how to fight. Such official guidance can then be changed or updated, given new technology, tactics or

threats. Moreover, it can be professionally debated and intellectually discussed to better prepare our soldiers as well as to improve our doctrine. Keep in mind, "Every doctrine, every technique, and every weapon needs the scrutiny of fresh minds."³² As Albert Einstein said, "The important thing is not to stop questioning."

Universal Truths May Be Dangerous. Although a set of universal maritime truths may be created, they may be pointless or even dangerous if used improperly or if misunderstood. Specifically, universal principles could be dangerous if they encouraged "the dogmatic and inflexible attitudes so harmful to the sea-officer, whose object, said Nelson, was 'to embrace the happy moment which now and then offers.'"³³ In other words, strict adherence to doctrine could tie your hands at sea, where opportunism is often vital.

Historically, this has not been the case, nor has it been accepted as so by past military writers. Doctrine must be applied using sound judgment, but not as if it were law. Good doctrine should clarify rather than confuse. It should expand knowledge and options rather than limit them. Most military writers have maintained the existence of fundamental naval principles of war. But just as fire can be used properly or destructively, so too can these principles. Simply because they may be abused or misused does not mean they are of no value. Even Mahan said naval strategy was based on fundamental truths which, "when correctly formulated, are

rightly called principles; these truths when ascertained, are in themselves unchangeable."³⁴ Clausewitz was not one for listing principles of war, but even he acknowledged there are times when the

arch of truth culminates in such a keystone these principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference for the movements he has been trained to carry out, rather than to serve as a guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must take."³⁵

Principles are merely tools for the thinking professional. Doctrine should provide the frame of reference in which we think about using those tools properly. It is not a checklist for action. When used dogmatically, doctrine can be dangerous. But doctrine is not dangerous when trained minds apply it using judgment and logical thought.

Naval Warfare is too Complex for Simple Rules. This argument claims the conditions of naval warfare, especially for a global navy, are just too complex, diverse, and unpredictable for any simple set of rules to govern them.³⁶ With the many maritime missions and different weapon systems the Navy employs, no single doctrine could possibly address such diverse forms of air, land, and sea warfare. Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie (Ret.) emphasizes the Navy has a "requirement to adapt, to a greater degree than the other services, to unexpected situations," and "that's why it's so difficult to plan."³⁷ He also strongly agrees with Rear Admiral Strasser that doctrine would, consequently, be too

restrictive. This could be labeled the "too hard to do" argument.

The opposing view holds that the other services have already done it. They have each developed doctrines to keep pace with a wide range of technologies and threats. If taken at face value, this argument would have invalidated the Maritime Strategy from the start.

On the contrary, complex warfighting problems and tasks are exactly what good doctrine should address. The real challenge is to develop doctrine to meet future contingencies, and to use available assets creatively, optimally and decisively. This is exactly the challenge the Navy faces in the '90s as we shift our emphasis to global stability. Greater demands will push each service to its absolute limit. For instance, the Navy had never planned to use more than three or four carrier battle groups together, even against the Soviets, yet in Desert Storm, six were employed. Four even operated inside the Gulf's restricted waterway--an idea never previously contemplated. The Navy will be forced to continue making fundamental reassessments such as these, many involving assumptions and policies in place since World War II.³⁸ These uncertainties only reemphasize the Navy's need for doctrine to address such challenges.

V. THE CASE FOR OFFICIAL NAVAL DOCTRINE

JCS Guidance. One of the functions the Navy is responsible for, as listed in JCS Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), is to develop "doctrines, procedures, tactics, and techniques employed by service forces."³⁹ This guidance appears very clear; nevertheless, the Navy has not done so, unless it interprets "doctrines" to mean only tactical doctrine. When considered in light of the inherent cultural and intellectual barriers between the services already discussed, these differences could greatly impact the success of joint operations. Consequently, Joint Pub 0-1 states one premise of the joint doctrine system is that "commanders are responsible for unifying military effort based on doctrine and the requirements of the situation confronting them."⁴⁰ JCS Pub 0-2 further defines this command relationship, stating:

Common doctrines are essential for mutual understanding and confidence between a commander and assigned subordinates, and among the subordinates themselves, so that timely and effective action will be taken by all concerned in the absence of specific instructions.⁴¹

It comes down to common doctrine, mutual understanding and confidence all impacting the operational employment of combat forces--the bottom line in any military organization.

More Joint Operations Our failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt at Desert One in 1980 provided a sobering example of what can result when communication and coordination breaks

down during the fog and friction of war. Although successful, our 1983 operation Urgent Fury in Grenada uncovered similar shortcomings. Former Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, attributed "the undue complications of jointness" to be one of three factors why the operation was more difficult than anticipated.⁴² Moreover, the Congressional investigations prompted by these operations eventually led to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which forced the military to redress these shortcomings. Realistically, we can only expect to see more emphasis on these joint approaches in the future. As a recent Airpower Journal article put it, "joint doctrine is here to stay. Once the factors inhibiting the development of joint doctrine are overcome, we will have the most effective armed service possible in a time of decreasing resources."⁴³ Instead of dragging our feet over the "undue complications of jointness," we must work through these problems as soon as possible.

The Navy needs a doctrine that will address a number of key issues, especially in this area of joint operations. Specifically, it must provide guidance on the employment of carrier-based airpower in Third World contingencies. Current fleet operating instructions simply do not give enough importance to gaining and maintaining air supremacy over the land using carrier-based aircraft. The importance of waging strategic air operations and air interdiction to contribute to campaign success on the land is not even mentioned. This lack

of doctrine and guidance is reflected in the systems the Navy now employs for deep-attack operations. In a conventional carrier wing of 86 aircraft, only 20 A-6E medium-attack aircraft have such a capability. This fact may explain why the Navy only accounted for 3,500--or 12 percent--of a total of 30,000 sorties flown during the first two weeks of Desert Storm.⁴⁴ Yet, "this effort required six of the Navy's 14 deployable aircraft carriers, dependence on massive Air Force refueling support, and carriers positioned in waters previously considered too dangerous for carrier operations."⁴⁵ Command arrangements for this type of contingency operation must also be addressed through naval doctrine. Prior to Desert Storm, "the Navy's position that carrier-based air power should not be controlled by a functional air component commander had been expressed numerous times and had posed a serious problem in the conduct of operations in both Korea and Southeast Asia."⁴⁶ The Gulf War pointed out the need for doctrine to define the command arrangements necessary to integrate the employment of carrier- and land-based aircraft in support of a theater-wide campaign.⁴⁷

These problems could be resolved by developing a naval doctrine that clearly provides official guidelines on how to best employ multiple carriers and their medium-attack aircraft in operational campaigns. Unless it does so, the Navy will continue to stand out as one of those factors inhibiting the development of joint doctrine and armed service effectiveness.

Growing Naval Importance. Maritime forces have played an historic role in maintaining our global balance of power, and this role, by necessity, will expand in the future. As we rely less on manned bombers and multiple warhead missiles, maritime forces must play an increasingly important role in ensuring both strategic nuclear and conventional deterrence. Consequently, "Instead of simply concentrating on maritime missions, in this new era, the Navy should, indeed must, focus on national missions."⁴⁸ As one Marine colonel stated:

our dual track thinking in terms of distinct maritime and land theaters must change. The ranges, lethality, and accuracy of both sea-based and land-based systems have reduced "pure" maritime and land theaters to almost theoretical concepts. It is impossible to separate the two, and the separation associated strictly with the types of⁴⁹ forces employed (naval or ground) is artificial at best.

This same conclusion is driving the Air Force to combine their Strategic and Tactical Air Commands this summer. By abolishing the strategic and tactical distinctions that pre-date even the formation of the Air Force, they are rethinking and reorganizing to quickly and efficiently provide greater combat capability for the theater commander. The Navy must, likewise, get on board here and dismiss these artificial separations. The critical part Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) played throughout Desert Storm illustrates this merging of naval strategic and tactical capabilities. Every aspect of our American military forces must be reassessed to find new and better ways of integrating and employing weapons,

people and technology to focus on strategic--not land, sea, or air--objectives. Without this fundamental reassessment, even new weapons and technology, traditionally America's strong suit, will gain us little advantage. We must keep in mind, "Superiority in weapons stems not only from advancing technology, but also from relating the technology selected to doctrine of tactical or strategic application."⁵⁰ General George B. Crist (Ret.), former commander of Central Command, more clearly explained, "the U.S. Navy is well equipped with the hi-tech weaponry to wage combat against the Soviet Union; it is not so adequately prepared to deal with Third World contingencies."⁵¹ Correcting the problem, he concluded

will take a shift from the Admirals' fixation with forward-deployed carrier battle groups and the "maritime strategy" to the more mundane missions of controlling sealanes, moving troops and providing naval gunfire and tactical air support to amphibious operations.⁵²

Although his statement may be somewhat contentious, Gen Crist does highlight the need for fundamental analysis and open-minded thinking. Only doctrine can provide the sound framework necessary for every such reassessment of missions, capabilities, and future naval warfare.

VI. CONCLUSION

Doctrine provides a necessary foundation for each of our services. The Army has properly demonstrated just how doctrine should be used to organize, train, equip, and employ forces. To date, the Navy has not recognized this importance, and, consequently, has no official doctrine. There are a number of good reasons why it has not done so, however, as Rear Admiral Strasser pointed out, the Navy actually does have many elements of doctrine. It just has an aversion to labeling them as such.

The Maritime Strategy has often been compared to doctrine, but in actuality, it did not meet any of the traditional definitions of doctrine. It served the Navy well in the 1980s, but it cannot meet current and future maritime challenges. While it entailed many of the Navy's fundamental principles, they must now be extracted, reassessed and codified into a single, official doctrine for the Navy of the 21st century.

Without such a doctrine, the Navy will be unable to effectively address problems such as those identified in Desert Storm. More emphasis must be placed on integrating and employing naval forces in joint and theater-wide operations. Similarly, Third World contingencies cannot be effectively dealt with using Cold War assumptions and approaches. Change forces the Navy to play a greater role in deterrence and

warfighting of the future, and doctrine is the only means to meet those challenges efficiently.

Such a doctrine must become the fighting foundation for every sailor, airman and soldier connected with American naval power. It should be the basis for how the Navy plans to fight, when and if it does, how it will train, and how it will structure and build future forces and equipment. It must be realistic, understandable and useful. Most importantly, it must become the core of naval combat philosophy, "acting as a unifying thought process without producing predictable thoughts."⁵³

Obviously, developing an official doctrine will be an extremely tough challenge, but not one that the most powerful and professional navy in the world cannot take on, full speed ahead. Only open-mindedness, innovation and a great deal of leadership can make it happen.

. . . no servitude is more hopeless than that of unintelligent submission to an idea formally correct, yet incomplete. It has all the vicious misleading of a half-truth unqualified by appreciation of modifying conditions; and so seamen who disdained theories, and hugged the belief in themselves as "practical," became doctrinaires in the worst sense.⁵⁴

Alfred Thayer Mahan

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